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<rss:title>Judgment and Decision Making, current contents</rss:title>
<rss:link>http://journal.sdm.org/</rss:link>
<rss:description>Judgment and Decision Making, current contents</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Jonathan Baron</dc:creator>
<dc:language>en-US</dc:language>
<rss:items>
<rdf:Seq>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://journal.sjdm.org/9713/jdm9713.pdf" />
<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://journal.sjdm.org/91203/jdm91203.pdf" />
<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://journal.sjdm.org/9610/jdm9610.pdf" />
<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://journal.sjdm.org/91001/jdm91001.pdf" />
<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://journal.sjdm.org/9921/jdm9921.pdf" />
<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://journal.sjdm.org/9811/jdm9811.pdf" />
<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://journal.sjdm.org/9901/jdm9901.pdf" />
<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://journal.sjdm.org/9825/jdm9825.pdf" />
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<rss:item rdf:about="http://journal.sjdm.org/9713/jdm9713.pdf">
<rss:title> The role of representation in experience-based choice --- Adrian R. Camilleri --- Ben R. Newell</rss:title>
<rss:link>http://journal.sjdm.org/9713/jdm9713.pdf</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
<![CDATA[<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
  Recently it has been observed that different choices can be made
  about structurally identical risky decisions depending on whether
  information about outcomes and their probabilities is learned by
  description or from experience. Current evidence is equivocal with
  respect to whether this choice ``gap'' is entirely an artefact of
  biased samples. The current experiment investigates whether a
  representational bias exists at the point of encoding by examining
  choice in light of decision makers' mental representations of the
  alternatives, measured with both verbal and nonverbal judgment
  probes. We found that, when estimates were gauged by the nonverbal
  probe, participants presented with information in description format
  (as opposed to experience) had a greater tendency to overestimate
  rare events and underestimate common events. The choice gap,
  however, remained even when accounting for this judgment distortion
  and the effects of sampling bias. Indeed, participants' estimation
  of the outcome distribution did not mediate their subsequent
  choice. It appears that experience-based choices may derive from a
  process that does not explicitly use probability information.</div>]]>
</content:encoded></rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="http://journal.sjdm.org/91203/jdm91203.pdf">
<rss:title> Emerging sacred values: Iran's nuclear program --- Morteza Dehghani --- Rumen Iliev --- Sonya Sachdeva --- Scott Atran --- Jeremy Ginges --- Douglas Medin</rss:title>
<rss:link>http://journal.sjdm.org/91203/jdm91203.pdf</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
<![CDATA[<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
Sacred values are different from secular values in that they are often
associated with violations of the cost-benefit logic of rational
choice models. Previous work on sacred values has been largely limited
to religious or territorial conflicts deeply embedded in historical
contexts. In this work we find that the Iranian nuclear program, a
relatively recent development, is treated as sacred by some Iranians,
leading to a greater disapproval of deals which involve monetary
incentives to end the program. Our results suggest that depending on
the prevalence of such values, incentive-focused negotiations may
backfire.</div>]]>
</content:encoded></rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="http://journal.sjdm.org/9610/jdm9610.pdf">
<rss:title> Prefer a cash slap in your face over credit for halva --- Hamed Ekhtiari --- Ali Jannati --- Morteza Dehghani --- Azarakhsh Mokri</rss:title>
<rss:link>http://journal.sjdm.org/9610/jdm9610.pdf</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
<![CDATA[<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
  We investigated how frequency and amount of punishment affect the
  decision making of Iranian subjects.  In our first experiment,
  performing a computer-based Persian version of the Iowa Gambling
  Task (IGT), our subjects scored remarkably lower than their Western
  counterparts.  Moreover, our subjects chose more frequently and more
  rapidly from decks that had less frequent but larger amounts of
  punishments in comparison to decks that had more frequent
  punishments with smaller amounts.  In our second experiment,
  subjects did not differentiate between decks with the same frequency
  of punishment but with different punishment amounts. However, among
  decks with the same amount but different frequency of punishment, a
  significant preference was apparent towards decks with less
  frequency of punishment.  Our results differ from previous studies,
  indicating a different strategy in risky decision making among
  healthy adult Iranian subjects, as they show low attention to the
  amount of punishment and are more concerned with the frequency of
  punishment.</div>]]>
</content:encoded></rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="http://journal.sjdm.org/91001/jdm91001.pdf">
<rss:title> Moral emotions as determinants of third-party punishment --- Rob M. A. Nelissen --- Marcel Zeelenberg</rss:title>
<rss:link>http://journal.sjdm.org/91001/jdm91001.pdf</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
<![CDATA[<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
Third-party punishment has recently received attention as an explanation
for human altruism. Feelings of anger in response to norm violations
are assumed to motivate third-party sanctions, yet there is only sparse
and indirect support for this idea. We investigated the impact of both
anger and guilt feelings on third-party sanctions. In two studies both emotions
were independently manipulated. Results show that anger and guilt
independently constitute sufficient but not necessary causes of
punishment. Low levels of punishment are observed only when neither
emotion is elicited. We discuss the implications of these findings for
the functions of altruistic sanctions.</div>]]>
</content:encoded></rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="http://journal.sjdm.org/9921/jdm9921.pdf">
<rss:title> Are within-subjects designs transparent? --- Charles Lambdin --- Victoria A. Shaffer</rss:title>
<rss:link>http://journal.sjdm.org/9921/jdm9921.pdf</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
<![CDATA[<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
Researchers frequently argue that within-subjects designs should be
avoided because they result in research hypotheses that are transparent
to the subjects in the study.  This conjecture was empirically tested
by replicating several classic between-subjects experiments as
within-subjects designs.  In two additional experiments, psychology
students were given the within-subjects versions of these studies and
asked to guess what the researcher was hoping to find (i.e. the
research hypothesis), and members of the Society for Judgment and
Decision Making (SJDM) were asked to predict how well students would
perform this task.  On the whole, students were unable to identify the
research hypothesis when provided with the within-subjects version of
the experiments.  Furthermore, SJDM members were largely inaccurate in
their predictions of the transparency of a within-subjects design.  </div>]]>
</content:encoded></rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="http://journal.sjdm.org/9811/jdm9811.pdf">
<rss:title> The Risk-as-feelings hypothesis in a Theory-of-planned-behaviour perspective --- Therese Kobbeltvedt --- Katharina Wolff</rss:title>
<rss:link>http://journal.sjdm.org/9811/jdm9811.pdf</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
<![CDATA[<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TpB: Ajzen, 1985; 1991) is based on a
utility framework, and the Risk-as-Feelings hypothesis (RaF:
Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, \& Welch, 2001) is a feelings-based
behavioural model. The TpB and RaF are first compared and contrasted.
Two empirical studies investigated the predictive power of
consequence-based vs.\ affect-based evaluative judgements for
behavioural intentions: Study 1 (\textit{n} = 94) applied a regression
model to examine the predictive value of a subset of shared variables,
unique TpB variables, and unique RaF variables for intentions to have
unsafe sex. Study 2 (\textit{n} = 357) experimentally examined whether
intentions are driven by consequences or feelings, in two decision
vignettes with opposite qualities: A positive hedonic experience with
potential negative consequences (unsafe sex) vs.\ a negative hedonic
experience with potential positive consequences (back surgery). The
results supported the TpB by emphasising the role of outcome-expectations
in the construction of intentions, and the RaF by showing the
importance of affective subcomponents in attitudes.
% Behavioural
% decision models need to capture the general, the individual, and the
% dynamic. The inclusion of contextual and individual trends may
% facilitate behavioural predictions.  
% unclear</div>]]>
</content:encoded></rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="http://journal.sjdm.org/9901/jdm9901.pdf">
<rss:title> A fine-grained analysis of the jumping-to-conclusions bias in schizophrenia --- Andreas Gloeckner --- Steffen Moritz</rss:title>
<rss:link>http://journal.sjdm.org/9901/jdm9901.pdf</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
<![CDATA[<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
Impaired decision behavior has been repeatedly observed in schizophrenia
patients. We investigated several cognitive mechanisms that might
contribute to the jumping-to-conclusions bias (JTC) seen in
schizophrenia patients: biases in information-gathering, information
weighting and integration, and overconfidence, using the process
tracing paradigm Mouselab. Mouselab allows for an in-depth exploration
of various decision-making processes in a structured information
environment. A total of 37 schizophrenia patients and 30 healthy
controls participated in the experiment. Although showing less focused
and systematic information search, schizophrenia patients practically
considered all pieces of information and showed no JTC in the sense of
collecting less pieces of evidence. Choices of patients and controls
both approximated a rational solution quite well, but patients showed
more extreme confidence ratings. Both groups mainly used weighted
additive decision strategies for information integration and only a
small proportion relied on simple heuristics. Under high stress
induced by affective valence plus time pressure, however, schizophrenia
patients switched to equal weighting strategies: less valid cues and
more valid ones were weighted equally. </div>]]>
</content:encoded></rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="http://journal.sjdm.org/9825/jdm9825.pdf">
<rss:title> Methodological pitfalls of the Unconscious Thought paradigm --- Laurent Waroquier --- David Marchiori --- Olivier Klein --- Axel Cleeremans</rss:title>
<rss:link>http://journal.sjdm.org/9825/jdm9825.pdf</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
<![CDATA[<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
  According to Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT: Dijksterhuis \&
  Nordgren, 2006), complex decisions are best made after a period of
  distraction assumed to elicit ``unconscious thought''. Over three
  studies, respectively offering a conceptual, an identical and a
  methodologically improved replication of Dijksterhuis et al.\
  (2006), we reassessed UTT's predictions and dissected the decision
  task used to demonstrate these predictions.  We failed to find any
  evidence for the benefits of unconscious decision-making. By
  contrast, we found some evidence that conscious deliberation can
  lead to better decisions. Further, we identified
  methodological weaknesses in the UTT decision task: (a) attributes
  weighting was neglected although attributes were seen as different
  in importance; (b) the material was not properly counterbalanced; and
  (c) there was some confusion in the experimental instructions.  We
  propose methodological improvements that address these concerns.</div>]]>
</content:encoded></rss:item>
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